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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
2	X	
3	FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA, et al.,	
4	Plaintiffs,	
5		20MC209
6	V •	Telephone Conference
7	VR ADVISORY SERVICES, LTD., et al.,	
8	Defendants.	
9	x	
10		New York, N.Y. October 22, 2020 2:00 p.m.
11		2.00 p.m.
12	Before:	
13	HON. PAUL A. ENG	GELMAYER,
14		District Judge
15	APPEARANC:	ES
	MEISTER SEELIG & FEIN LLP	
16 17	Attorneys for Applicant BY ALEXANDER DIMITRI PENCU CHRISTOPHER JOHN MAJOR	
	AUSTIN DONG KIM	
18	KOBRE & KIM LLP	
19	Attorneys for Respondent BY: ZACHARY DAVID ROSENBAUM	
20	DARRYL G. STEIN	
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(The Court and all parties appearing telephonically)

THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon, everyone.

This is Judge Engelmayer. I'm calling the case of Federal

Republic of Nigeria, et al. versus VR Advisory Services, LTD,

et al., 20MC409.

Let me begin by confirming my court reporter is on the line.

(Pause)

THE COURT: Good afternoon. Thank you for your service.

Who do I have for the applicants, the Federal Republic of Nigeria?

MR. MAJOR: Good afternoon, your Honor. This is Chris
Major from Meister Seelig & Fein. We represent the applicants,
the Federal Republic of Nigeria and its Attorney General,
Malami. I'm joined by two colleagues, Alexander Pencu and
Austin Kim. We've listed Mr. Pencu as the second potential
speaker, although, it's our plan for me, your Honor, Chris
Major, to do most of the speaking on behalf of the applicants.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Major. Appreciated and welcome to your colleagues, as well.

Who do I have for VR Advisory?

MR. ROSENBAUM: Good afternoon, your Honor. Zachary Rosenbaum, Kobre and Kim. I am joined by my colleague, Darryl Stein, and Josef Klazen. It is our intention that I will argue

the first point re in our application and Mr. Stein will argue the second.

THE COURT: All right. Welcome to both of you.

All right. I have allocated an hour for this. We have a hard stop at three o'clock. Before we get into the merits of the dispute, I want to see if counsel have worked out a resolution with respect to the Kobre & Kim Associates.

Mr. Rosenbaum.

MR. ROSENBAUM: It does not appear so, your Honor, unfortunately. To answer the acute question that your Honor posed, I think, again, unfortunately, the parties are in agreement that even if your Honor rules on the issues that we're going to argue today by November 1st, that will not necessarily resolve the issue that we've presented with respect to the impending employment of Mr. Barkhordar.

or two just about that issue. To begin with, I take it, just very briefly, because I'm trying not to use up a lot of time on this solvable issue that could be devoted to argument, but was it Kobre & Kim or someone else who fronted the issue or discovered the issue and reported it to the other side of Mr. Barkhordar's having had some prior involvement in his earlier barrister role with the issues at hand?

counsel for applicants in this proceeding.

MR. ROSENBAUM: Our firm learned it had informed

THE COURT: Are you able to disclose how your firm learned it?

MR. ROSENBAUM: I could. Unfortunately, your Honor, I don't know that specifically, but I expect that it was in the course of interviews.

THE COURT: I take it by the time that the issue had arisen, he had already accepted a job offer at Kobre & Kim?

MR. ROSENBAUM: Correct, although, it's a conditional offer. From what I am told, it was the applicant who informed our firm of his prior employment and the intern informed Nigeria.

THE COURT: The applicant, in other words, did the right thing, as you see it, and was forthright about the potential conflict presented by his earlier work?

MR. ROSENBAUM: He was forthright with us and we were forthright with all counsel for Nigeria, recognizing that this case spans across the globe, or at least to London.

THE COURT: Briefly, Mr. Rosenbaum, let's play out each alternative scenario here. Let's assume, first of all, that you get what you want, which is that the 1782 order is vacated and there is no subpoena. Play out that scenario, and that that was ruled on before November 1, why is it that, in the proceedings before me, which, by definition, would have terminated, there is any remaining issue as to Mr. Barkhordar's employment.

MR. GREENBLUM: My understanding, and the petitioners can speak for themselves, obviously, but if your Honor ruled in that fashion, which, of course, we believe the Court should, there would be an appeal, and both for efficiency and other reasons, we would expect to continue to represent our clients on the appeal. There are potentially other matters that could arise in the United States --

THE COURT: Wait a minute. Just to be clear, the only application relevant before me involves the proceeding before me and its appeal. I understand the theory that an appeal may elongate the time, such that any ruling by me isn't a problem solver, but one thing I'm not going to be doing is giving a green light as to the effect on other proceedings of Mr. Barkhordar's prior service. I can only really opine on whether there is any disqualification in the matter before me and its appellate sequel, but I understand your point, that even if you win, in the event of an appeal, this matter, if you will, is not over.

Play out now the other scenario in which you lose, and that order is not vacated and the subpoena is upheld in its entirety, just to choose the polar opposite scenario. I take it the argument there would be that you would then be appealing and the matter is not completed; correct?

MR. ROSENBAUM: Well, perhaps we would appeal, but irrespective of an appeal, we have served responses and

objections to the subpoenas that were served on the respondent, those which we accepted for and would expect then to be involved barring the outcome of an appeal in the discovery process sought by the petitioners here. So, I think, in that instance, it would result, in turn, in our continued involvement very shortly or immediately after such a ruling, which, of course --

THE COURT: All right. The relevant takeaway is that the speed of my ruling, because of subsequent events arising out of this petition and the action I take on it is no cure to the problem here. So, if there is a cure short of Mr. Barkhordar not taking employment, it's either the parties reaching an agreement on a — somebody is interrupting me, I'm sorry. Is that the court reporter or otherwise?

(Pause)

THE COURT: Who was that? Who was that that just tried to speak?

MR. ROSENBAUM: This is Mr. Rosenbaum. It was not me, your Honor.

THE COURT: I'll state the obvious. This is a phone call. You can't be interrupting anybody speaking, least of all the judge. The court reporter needs to hear one voice and one voice alone.

All right. So, I understand why my resolution may not be, by November 1st, may not be a complete solution.

Let me ask you, Mr. Major, briefly, why is it that the screening mechanism, which, of course, is very familiar to New York courts, as a means of avoiding exactly this sort of problem, is not acceptable here?

MR. MAJOR: Thank you, your Honor. This is Chris Major on behalf of the applicant.

First of all, your Honor, just to be clear, that was not me interrupting. I was on mute and will continue to be on mute unless I'm addressed by the Court. It sounded like interference to me, not an attempt to interrupt. I just want to make clear for the record that that was not me attempting to interrupt.

So, to answer your question, your Honor, the screening mechanism, we do not believe, is sufficient for a variety of reasons.

Number 1, obviously, we are taking this information from others because English lawyers were not involved in London; however, our understanding is that the English lawyers' declaration that was submitted to your Honor does not accurately and fully state the level of involvement that he had in this matter. Our understanding is that he was involved in numerous strategy and consultation sessions with the client, with other English counsel. He had access to strategy memorandums and had, while it was a short period of time, it was a very critical period of time in this case.

In addition, we were advised that, while Kobre & Kim is a relatively large law firm with lots of offices, its London office is quite small. Our understanding is that's somewhere in the high teens in terms of the number of lawyers. That, in and of itself, makes the screening more difficult.

In terms of how this gentleman advised Kobre & Kim of his prior involvement, we can't imagine that he was somehow unaware that this was an issue that just crossed up. It's not as if he learned subsequently that his prior firm had been involved in a case. This is a proceeding involving what is now a \$10 billion arbitration award. It certainly was something that would be at the forefront of his mind while he was listening in on all of these conferences and readings of confidential, privileged memorandum.

The fact that he then subsequently went and interviewed with Kobre & Kim is alarming, from a U.S. perspective, in terms of a U.S. ethical rule. He went and sought a job with the adversary on, what I would assume, was the biggest case that he had any involvement with during his prior employment.

So, our client here is entitled, under the U.S. rules, to not just ensure that his confidential information is not disclosed, and we're not comfortable that that would be the case, but also, our client is entitled that there not be any appearance of impropriety. They are defending against a

\$10 billion arbitration award that has been set forth in our papers through the Attorney General Malami's declaration. It would be utterly devastating to the entire nation if you look at it on a scale relative to its fiscal and economic obligations.

So, given how critical this case is, given that we think that the lawyer had access to very confidential, very important legal consultation, and given the fact that we think he has not properly disclosed that to your Honor in his declaration is cause for great concern here, and that's why we don't think that the screening mechanism would be sufficient.

In addition, your Honor, I think, at this point, there really is -- it should not be anything before this Court. As we understand it, and we hope Kobre & Kim has not employed this gentleman yet, and therefore, there is nothing for us to do in terms of, for example, seeking disqualification. Only at that time would this Court have jurisdiction to issue a ruling.

This is really an issue that has to be determined in England. The issue of whether an English law firm can hire an English lawyer under the English ethical rules where that English lawyer had been involved in an ongoing, high stakes, and well-publicized litigation, the first step is whether or not they can do that under English law, which, of course, I'm not confident to comment on, but right now there is no ripe issue before the Court.

Kobre & Kim is asking the Court to give an advisory 1 2 opinion and to give it cover to hire this lawyer. Kobre & Kim, 3 when they interviewed this gentleman, in their small England office, knew who the barrister was on the other side of the 4 5 case. Frankly, this firm and the English lawyer should not 6 have even interviewed, because they both knew about this issue 7 way back then. So, your Honor, our client feels strongly that the screening mechanism would not be sufficient and we think 8 9 that, under the rules, our client's informed consent is 10 required, even if the screening mechanism is put into place. 11 Certainly, your Honor, I'll finish -- I'm sorry, your 12 Honor --13 14 I'm really trying to use time for our argument. enough.

THE COURT: That's okay, you've finished. I've heard

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Look, Mr. Rosenbaum, first of all, nothing that I can do can reach beyond the scope of this proceeding, if, in fact, as appears to be the case, this is one small chapter in a much broader-running set of engagements between your clients and the law firms here. Please understand that the most that this Court could do would be limited to the 1782 proceeding. So, Mr. Major makes an absolutely valid point that there are all sorts of implications here that may exist for your firm and for the lawyer, Mr. Barkhordar, that are untouched by anything that I can do here.

So, that much ought to be crystal clear, that the ask

here is really limited to, and the remedy here that I could give would be limited to the 1782 proceeding, full stop.

What I do think would be useful for me would be to get a detailed affidavit from Kobre & Kim describing to me of what it knew and when it knew it with respect to the issues presented here.

Mr. Rosenbaum, can I get that by the end of the day tomorrow?

MR. ROSENBAUM: I believe so, your Honor. I'll confer with my colleagues and we can inform the Court if there is any reason we cannot, but I expect we can.

Additionally, your Honor, it is understood that this Court's jurisdiction is limited to the proceeding before it, but, in fact, there is a proceeding before this Court, and the New York rules apply, and that is the purpose for which we're sending this piece of it to this Court.

THE COURT: May I ask you, the employee says he accepted the offer in September of 2020. I was first notified of this issue on, I think, October 21st, 2020. When did Kobre & Kim first become aware that this attorney had any connection to relevant proceedings, Mr. Rosenbaum?

MR. ROSENBAUM: Your Honor, my review of our records, our first communication with counsel, or the Federal Republic of Nigeria, was September 28th, 2020, on this subject.

THE COURT: Kobre & Kim didn't notify the Court and

didn't seek relief until 23 days later?

MR. ROSENBAUM: Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Help me why I'm supposed to help you with that problem if you were dropping this on me that late? I'm trying to understand, in other words, there is a think-fast quality about the timing of the application here in relation to oral argument. The case was pending and it looks like three or four weeks were waited before I was notified that there was this issue.

MR. ROSENBAUM: Understood, your Honor. It was the discussion between counsel -- I think the expectation from our firm was that it would be worked out and that it was not a substantial issue, particularly because of the willingness to screen. I can't speak specifically to the English rules of ethical conduct, but I do think they are fundamentally more permissive than the New York rules, and it was on that basis, because New York is not as clear, that we sought to bring it to your Honor's attention once we learned that it was something that the petitioner in this case was unlikely to consent to.

THE COURT: Can I ask you this, I mean, reading through the applicant's application, he was certainly aware of the proceeding. Could he have been aware of the proceeding during the time he did some work on it without being aware that Kobre & Kim represented an opposite party? Mr. Rosenbaum.

MR. ROSENBAUM: I believe so, your Honor. I believe

that he --

THE COURT: -- did not know about Kobre & Kim --

MR. ROSENBAUM: -- no, I believe he might have, but I don't know that he did. So, I haven't met him. Perhaps that's something that we can speak to in the declaration from our firm that your Honor is asking for. In other words, I don't want to surmise on facts that I don't know specifically.

THE COURT: I want to know, among other things, when the firm first became aware that an applicant for it had connection to this matter of the sort that he did, when the applicant told the firm and when the firm otherwise became aware of it.

Look, may I suggest, Mr. Rosenbaum, to state the obvious, that, apart from any application here, the matter before me is a small part of a much larger problem. You have here a young person, relatively early in their career, who may or may not want to get caught up in the maelstrom that may ensue, independent of whatever I might decide here. I would encourage you, after this call, to elevate the issues within the firm and to make sure that the applicant or the conditional offer holder is aware of the whirlwind that may surround these issues. I want to make sure, before the road is traveled farther, that there is visibility from both employer and punitive employee about what may ensue here. Okay?

Sure. Okay. Yes, your Honor.

MR. ROSENBAUM:

THE COURT: With that, I think that is time enough for this issue. We have 20 minutes per side, not 30. Let's begin with you, Mr. Rosenbaum. Mr. Rosenbaum, I have some questions for you, but I'm happy to hear a brief distillation of your own. Go ahead.

MR. ROSENBAUM: Thank you, your Honor. And briefly, to start, we searched high and low for any other example, besides the Attorney General of the Federal Republic of Nigeria entering the U.S. not through the MLAT process in seeking aid under Section 1782 for a criminal investigation or a criminal proceeding. It appears to us — and the reason I'm only edging slightly on that is because I don't know that we can search every docket of every district court in the country, but we searched high and low and found no other example, which I think is quite telling.

THE COURT: But isn't the example, the previous one, involving this very controversy? In other words, couldn't the same have been said about the application before Judge Schofield?

MR. ROSENBAUM: Yes, your Honor. That is one of the handfuls that this issue perhaps could have been raised, but I don't think, in any sense, that forecloses it being raised here.

THE COURT: I'm only pointing out that it's not a null said. It is indeed an uncommon occurrence that a sovereign

entering under the MLAT process, I take that to be your point, but it's not unheard of.

MR. ROSENBAUM: It's not unheard of, but what I'm suggesting is, it's not unheard of for any MLAT signatory except for Nigeria, that we've seen.

In that sense, there are two examples, one of which your Honor is directly involved in this one, there is the one before Judge Schofield, and there was the one in 2013 in the Eastern District of Virginia, which was rejected on similar grounds or referred to the same ground that we're seeking today under the discretionary factors of Intel.

As we read the petitioner's papers, the gravamen of their argument is not that the Court shouldn't exercise its discretion, it is that the Court does not have discretion. We think once your Honor concludes that the Court does have discretion under the third Intel factor, that it's a relatively easy analysis, given the comprehensive nature and purpose of the MLAT and Section 1782.

THE COURT: Has Nigeria used the MLAT, to your knowledge, in other cases?

MR. ROSENBAUM: We don't have visibility into that, your Honor, so I do not know. I do not know whether they attempted it here, and I do not know whether they attempted it in any of the other examples that we've seen that resulted in some public reporting.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. ROSENBAUM: So, in most analyses, we suggest the most natural place to start is with the plain language of Section 1782, and the plain language of the MLAT. As your Honor is well aware, and it's well established, that the district court in which person resides or shall/may -- and I'll triple underscore, because that's the way it is in my notes -- may order him to produce discovery.

So, by its very nature, Section 1782 is permissive, and Justice Ginsburg outlined in Intel, the third factor, which is the one that we ask that the Court focus on here, that the Court can and, we submit, should consider whether the 1782 request congeals with attempt to circumvent — and I'm using my own ellipses here — policies of the United States.

THE COURT: May I ask you this, I mean, I understand your theory that the mere fact that the existence of the MLAT and the election not to use it suggests circumvention. I welcome your focus on what the proposed subpoena actually contains. Tell me, what does that reveal? In other words, is there something about the nature of subpoena itself that says to you, it would not have likely been approved or at least in that scope, in the MLAT procedure. I'm trying to understand whether we can get any mileage — you can get any mileage out of the nature of the request here in terms of revealing an attempt to run the MLAT procedure.

MR. ROSENBAUM: I do, your Honor, because I looked both at the MLAT and in the DOJ's guidance. In the examples that are given in DOJ's guidance, while documents are certainly within the scope of the assistance under the MLAT, the key is identification of the document. The DOJ even gives examples — we attached it to our handbook or to our submission, but those examples are typically tangible, like bank accounts and records relating to it.

Here, you know, and this is -- it really frames, I think, the overarching policy issue and our issue, which is, the Attorney General, Malami, who is, in fact, the central authority for purposes of the MLAT. And I'll note -- and I don't need to read them all -- there are many instances of "shall" in the MLAT. It is strewn with the word "shall," while the 1782 has the permissive "may."

In that sense, Mr. Malami, Attorney General Malami is attempting to use the convention, the very broad, sweeping conventions of U.S. civil discovery with, I believe it's 56 separate requests that are being allocated, go well beyond the specificity that would accompany a request for assistance by the DOJ and are more in the vein of, you know, typical, broad-based, sweeping civil discovery.

THE COURT: I understood your theory, though, to be that the purpose, in fact, of the application here, less to be in truth about a criminal investigation and more to do with

undermining the existing arbitral award. To that point, are there features of the 56 requests that, in your view, can only be understood as aimed at undermining the arbitral award and not at relevance in a criminal case?

MR. ROSENBAUM: I believe so. This was -- it falls specifically into the second-for-use bucket. So, I would -- if your Honor wants to hear about it now, I think it's probably better suited for the category that Mr. Stein is prepared to speak to, but the answer, your Honor, is yes. It appears to us that the request, the 50-some-odd requests for any and all documents in a variety of categories, go beyond an actual subpoena for the criminal proceeding, and essentially a fishing expedition to search for evidence --

THE COURT: Okay, but that's the conclusion. I'm really trying to get -- and I don't much care whether it's you or Mr. Stein who answers, but just with precision, what are the several calls in the subpoena that, to you, are most clearly indicative that the purpose is to undermine the arbitral award as opposed to build a criminal case?

MR. STEIN: Hello, your Honor. This is Darryl Stein from Kobre & Kim.

I think the clearest example for this is the request of all documents and communications concerning the enforcement of any award granted in the arbitration in connection with the GSPA. This really exemplifies the breath of this request,

which is aimed -- we cannot see any connection to the criminal proceedings and the initial proceedings in Nigeria, which, I think, themselves are somewhat [unintelligible] but there really does seem there to be targeted only at sorting out and adversaries litigation strategy and without any connection to the investigations and proceedings in Nigeria.

THE COURT: What is your understanding, Mr. Stein, as to, as best you can tell, the focus of the criminal investigation?

MR. STEIN: It's a little bit difficult to tell, your Honor. The way it's defined in the application is criminal investigations and initial proceedings pending in Nigeria. In the opposition to the motion to dismiss, they identified five criminal proceedings involving certain individuals. It's unclear to us what the scope is of either of those investigations. I think one of the issues that we had and one of the problems with the application is that, that failure to specify what the ongoing proceedings are, having not identified them by party name, by case number, and even saying that the list that they provided, the examples they provided are not evolved, it's somewhat difficult. We haven't seen, I think, other situations where an application is quite as vague as to what the supposed foreign proceedings are.

THE COURT: Let me ask you, Mr. Stein, I mean, I understand that evidence has been adduced of payments that have

been made that at least are suggestive of some, or are perhaps consistent with an attempt to corrupt. I understand those two have been made more at the earlier stage of the contracting process and not at the arbitral enforcement process. Are you aware, from your involvement of the case, of any payments that have been made, or anything that is untoward getting to the arbitral enforcement. In other words, once the arbitral award is involved, has there been any suggestion of illegality, impropriety from that point forward in the chronology?

MR. STEIN: I don't believe that there are any allegations as to the role of when VR and P&ID became involved in this.

One thing, I think it's important to note, the arbitration rules issued in early 2017, the respondents had no connection to P&ID before that date, the allegations that have been made against the initial contracting. I note Nigeria has made a number of allegations, and those are the subject of the proceedings that are going to be taking place in England, that I'm not aware of any allegations concerning misconduct and the enforcement of the award.

THE COURT: When did VR acquire a quarter of P&ID?

MR. STEIN: I don't have the date in front of me in

which they finished the opposition. In connection with the

other 1782 proceeding, we've discussed this with counsel for

Nigeria. What we told them is that the discussions between VR

and P&ID only started in August of 2017, which is several months after the arbitrational award was issued.

THE COURT: But the documents that are being sought from VR predate 2017?

MR. STEIN: It appears to be. I'm sorry, your Honor.

THE COURT: Go ahead. In other words, I'm trying to understand the materials that are sought from VR presupposes they're a custodian of records that predate when the discussions began between VR and P&ID; is that correct?

MR. STEIN: I believe it's helpful to look at the request in two categories. I think the first category are the requests we have focused on before, which are those requests aimed at sorting out the litigation strategy against Nigeria. So these are the documents concerning the enforcement of any award.

There is a second category of documents, which it seems as though Nigeria's supposition is that VR might have, because P&ID previously had them and they attached this exhibit claiming that the documents were destroyed in 2016, and that seems to be part of the basis for their application here. Of course, the timeline for that doesn't match up, and to the extent that Nigeria is seeking documents, that are really P&ID documents, you know, that's an example of a situation where discovery would not usually be -- or it wouldn't go against a grant of discovery when the real party for whom discovery is

sought is a party to the foreign proceeding.

THE COURT: All right. I want to give you a few minutes to reply, you've got about five minutes left of your 20. So, what I would propose to do, Mr. Rosenbaum and Mr. Stein, unless you have something specific you would like to put on the table before I turn to Nigeria, I propose that we turn to Nigeria.

I did have one process question I want to ask, but let me just, before I do that, is there anything further you want to put on the table, Mr. Rosenbaum, before I turn to Nigeria?

MR. ROSENBAUM: No, your Honor. We appreciate a few minutes to rebut.

THE COURT: Thank you. Let me ask you the one question, which is, the application for discovery lists a Richard Dietz as an officer or director, and also VR Capital Group. It doesn't look to me as if your submission lists them as one of the respondents. It's unclear where they fit in. Did you mean, by your response, to capture the entirety of the respondents here?

MR. ROSENBAUM: No. There were — there are eight enumerated respondents, we have appeared on behalf of six. The reason for that is we accepted service for those six on the basis that they can be found in this jurisdiction and the other two cannot. We had some email exchanges with counsel for the petitioner and, to my knowledge, the petitioners have not

advanced efforts to serve those other two respondents with process.

THE COURT: So, formally, if your application to vacate were granted, would it -- although the logic of any ruling like that, conceivably, could logically run to the benefit of those two people, perhaps. As a formality, would I be vacating the entirety of the application or only such part as ran to the six who you represent?

MR. ROSENBAUM: Well, I think, as a matter of procedure, it would run into the six. I think there would likely be collateral estoppel issues if there is an attempt as to the other two. But, as to those two, there is a separate basis under 1782 because, we would submit, they're not found in this jurisdiction, and that was the basis on which we were not authorized to accept service.

THE COURT: I mean, I suppose the point would be that when and if those people are served and surface, it's for them to oppose, and if they oppose, at that point, whatever the arguments are about the relationship between any ruling here and them could be ventilated.

MR. ROSENBAUM: Agreed, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, with that, Mr. Major, I'm happy to turn to you.

MR. MAJOR: Thank you very much, your Honor.

Before I start my argument, I want to make a factual

point. Your Honor had asked if there were payments after the arbitration and after the arbitration award. I would point the Court, please, to 27-1 on this docket, which is the recent English judgment. Prior to that, at page 20 of that document, that's the ECF pagination, paragraphs 121 and 122 discuss — and this was, obviously, the high English court, which found a strong prima facie case of fraud, it cites payments to Ms. Taiga, the government lawyer charged with reviewing the GSPA, which is the agreement that gave rise to the arbitration. It recites payments to Ms. Taiga in 2017, 2018, and 2019.

I just wanted to make sure the record was clear on that actual point.

THE COURT: Are those payments in connection with arbitral enforcement? What is she up to at that point?

MR. MAJOR: Your Honor, obviously, I don't know what was in Ms. Taiga's head or the payor's head, but the implication, I think, is that it was either, you know, hush money, knowing that the investigation had commenced in Nigeria, I think that is a likely and a very reasonable conclusion to draw, but, of course, I don't know what exactly the quid pro quo was. The fact that, while the Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission was investigating the fraud, and by then, the funds that had bought P&ID, the shell company that holds the award, while they were attempts enforcement,

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salary in Nigeria for a government employee. Those payments are, to state the obvious, highly suspicious, and I think indicative of her failure of cooperation, whether that be through an affirmative cooperation or to her remaining silent.

THE COURT: What I don't understand is where she fits in into the events necessary to achieve enforcement.

MR. MAJOR: So, your Honor, obviously, she received payments at the time she was approving the contract, and her daughter received payments, but the EFCC was investigating this fraud at that time. So, she's receiving additional payments, probably to induce her not to tell the EFCC what she knew, which was that it was fraudulently procured, that there was nothing behind the company that got this GSPA, that there was no proper due diligence performed, that it wasn't channeled appropriately within the Nigerian government. All of those things, the perpetrators of the fraud and the subsequent acquirers of the fraudulent award knew that those types of -that type of information could undo the award. Look what happened in England. They are now facing a fraud trial, and the court in England has already found that there is a strong case of prima facie fraud, in part based on the investigation concerning Ms. Taiga.

So, I think that it appears to have been unsuccessful because Nigeria was able to gain this information, including through the other Section 1782 proceeding that was brought, but

it appears to me that the intent was to try to keep her from cooperating or otherwise speaking and providing information to the investigation that could ultimately lead to criminal prosecutions of the perpetrators of the fraud.

THE COURT: Thank you. That's responsive and helpful.

Just as to VR Advisory, what's the basis for the

premise that they are custodians of documents that predates the

date on which your adversary said discussions first began with

them and P&ID?

MR. MAJOR: It's our expectation that if VR Advisory, for example -- and VR Capital was the other purchaser of the entity holding the award. They, presumably before spending a considerable amount of their investors money on this award, would have done some form of due diligence, would have had some communications with persons who were involved with the arbitration with the underlying fraud, perhaps. We haven't heard from VR Advisory or the other respondents that they have no such documents. They're trying to evade having to produce documents and, presumably, the manner in which they contested this proceeding demonstrates that, in fact, they know they have documents.

THE COURT: Wait a minute. Wait. Wait. Wait. Wait. Enough. The question I asked you is what the basis is for your premise that they have the documents and the thrust of your answer is due diligence, I get that.

1 The fact that a party opposes production of documents 2 or opposes a subpoena does not mean anything, other than 3 they're standing on their legal rights. I'm not inferring 4 something from somebody standing on their legal rights. 5 All right, let's turn to the MLAT. In Nigeria, who is 6 it that would have to approve a request for an MLAT? What's 7 the position or the title? Is it the Attorney General? MR. MAJOR: Yes, your Honor. Obviously, I'm not an 8 9 expert on Nigerian law or exactly how the law enforcement rules 10 work there, but, presumably, that would be Attorney General 11 Malami. 12 THE COURT: We have limited time. I'm not sure why 13 you're not expert on that, since that is really a central 14 argument the other side made, but your clients include the 15 Attorney General; correct? 16 MR. MAJOR: Correct, your Honor. 17 THE COURT: What efforts did your client make before 18 filing the 1782 to pursue an MLAT as to the VR Advisory? 19 Please be as detailed as you can. 20 MR. MAJOR: Your Honor, I'm not aware of any effort, 21 at all, to pursue an MLAT. 22 THE COURT: Did your client reach the conclusion that 23 such an MLAT would be fruitful? 24 MR. MAJOR: No. 25

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THE COURT: Did your client consider an MLAT?

MR. MAJOR: Not to my knowledge.

THE COURT: Why did your client not consider an MLAT?

MR. MAJOR: Because, your Honor, the discovery that we're taking in the first Section 1782 proceeding and this Section 1782 proceeding don't require any special skill or any unique pursuits that would require engagement with the Department Of Justice. The MLAT is --

THE COURT: I'm sorry, I used to work for the

Department Of Justice and get MLATs all the time to other

countries. It wasn't that I had a special skill, but it was

that I was a criminal prosecutor investigating a crime to which

foreign evidence was relevant. There is nothing special about

that. It's just following smoke to see where there is fire.

You need to answer the question. Would an MLAT not have worked here? Did Nigeria have a policy of not using the MLAT treaty? I need an answer for why that was foregone.

MR. MAJOR: Your Honor, it was foregone because

Section 1782 is available to Mr. Malami and Nigeria. There is

nothing in the MLAT that could or would restrict Attorney

General Malami's use of Section 1782. That is something that

is --

THE COURT: Sorry. Sorry. I understand that you chose to do 1782, that's evident in your choice of the use of 1782. I'm trying to understand whether the judgment was that an MLAT would be less effectual. In other words, maybe

the Attorney General was unaware of the MLAT -- I suppose I would ask about that. Was your client aware of the existence of the MLAT procedure at the time your client chose to pursue 1782?

MR. MAJOR: I would think, of course, your Honor.
Yes.

THE COURT: So, on the assumption that your client was choosing what way to proceed, do you have any insight in the reasoning your client had in not first pursuing relief under the MLAT?

MR. MAJOR: Yes, your Honor. We can get these orders very quickly, as your Honor knows. Your Honor gave us the Section 1782 order quickly. The suggestion by the other side is that we should have gone through the Justice Department and then had the Justice Department file a Section 1782. That doesn't coincide with the twin purposes of the statute, which are efficient discovery, and I say Section 1782, efficient discovery, and also to encourage other countries to follow suit and also give cooperation to foreign proceedings, including proceedings in the U.S.

THE COURT: Can I ask you a question? That logic would apply literally in every case where a foreign government is seeking to build a criminal case. They could, in any case, say, you know what, those courts are faster than those DOJ bureaucrats, let's not use the MLAT because we're experiencing

that judges are quicker, and we don't have to go through the search-and-review and approval mechanisms in DOJ.

Is there something that distinguishes this case from other criminal cases that a foreign sovereign might want to bring through the use of American evidence?

MR. MAJOR: Your Honor, there would be some distinction with other cases, but the point is not there was something special about this case that leads it to Section 1782, it's the respondent's claim or they speculate that, somehow, relief would have been denied under the MLAT. If you look at article 3 of the MLAT, the four enumerated basis for denying assistance, none of them apply to what the respondents have argued here. In article —

THE COURT: Sorry. What is Nigeria's experience, though, with seeking assistance under the MLAT treaty with the U.S.?

MR. MAJOR: Your Honor, I don't know what the historical experience has been. As counsel for the respondents have noticed, that would be things that are not necessarily a matter of public record, and so I can't --

THE COURT: Wait a minute. Your client is the

Attorney General. Your client is party to a treaty with the

United States governing mutual assistance in criminal matters.

I'm asking you why your client has forgone this. The answer is

because those courts, under 1782, are faster. I'd ask you to

distinguish this case from other cases and why that wouldn't invite world wide ignoring of MLATs by any other criminal sovereign. You've been unable to distinguish the case. I've asked you whether or not Nigeria has had a bad experience with MLATs, you told me you can't answer. I need some help here.

MR. MAJOR: Your Honor, the burden is the not on us to demonstrate why the MLAT is not the sole proffer for us here. We have a right, under Section 1782, that right is not disturbed at all by the MLAT. The statutory requirements of Section 1782 have been met. The Court found that when it issued its order --

THE COURT: Sorry. Sorry. Mr. Major, the Court found that on the basis of your ex parte application. This is exactly why the adversarial system is such a wonderful part of the American legal system; I get to hear from the other side.

One of the things I learned, that I didn't know from your submissions, but which I learned from the other side, was the representation that was made to Judge Schofield in which you said, or your client told Judge Schofield that it was, quote, rank speculation that an applicant might seek to use the materials produced in those proceedings in, quote, other proceedings. According to your adversary, that turned out to be untruthful.

Is it factually correct that the materials that were elicited from the earlier 1782 proceeding were, in fact, used

in other proceedings?

MR. MAJOR: There were a few transfers that were discovered in Judge Schofield's Section 1782 proceeding that were in accordance with Second Circuit precedent, and it's permissible, that were submitted to the English court.

At the time of that briefing that your Honor references, no documents had been produced. We didn't know what documents we were going to get, we didn't know how the Federal Republic of Nigeria would view those, or where, in what proceedings, they would be useful.

So, the Second Circuit has been clear, though it is permissible for the recipient of documents to use them in other foreign proceedings and, in fact, the Eleventh Circuit has even found you can use them in subsequent U.S. proceedings --

THE COURT: I'm focusing on your honesty before -your client's honest before Judge Schofield. In the
application to Judge Schofield, you talked about people in
Nigeria who engaged in corruption, some of whom are former
Nigerian public officials that received bribes at P&ID. That
was the information you were seeking through the 1782
application. It's the sort of information that you say that,
when you got it, surprised you, though, and you therefore
turned it over, but before Judge Schofield, you said it was
rank speculation, and you did just that.

Did your law firm represent Nigeria in the application

before Judge Schofield?

MR. MAJOR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Why did you tell her it was rank speculation that you would do what you did with the evidence you were seeking?

MR. MAJOR: Because we did not know what we would receive in response or how it would be used. We're not in any of the foreign proceedings. We're obviously not doing the Nigerian investigation, we're not the English barristers presenting evidence to the English court, we did not know what we were getting. The other side was arguing that the 1782 should not be permitted because the material might be used otherwise. We argued that we can —

THE COURT: Actually, the other side didn't oppose the 1782. They sought access to the materials and you sought to deny that to them by making your rank speculation point.

The problem I'm having, among many things, is the atomization of the representation of Nigeria where Nigeria is essentially not harming with you with information about what its other representatives will do with the information it gets.

So, I'm ascribing to you good faith in telling Judge Schofield that, of course my client wouldn't do that with the evidence or bribes that we're seeking, and then Nigeria turns around and does it, and the defense is, we poor little local American counsels didn't know that our client would do that.

The problem is now Nigeria is now back before me. Why isn't a compelling discretionary factor under the Intel factors that Nigeria has blown its credibility with the Southern District of New York?

MR. MAJOR: Your Honor, respectfully, I do not think that they've blown their credibility --

THE COURT: I'll be the judge of that. Why should I treat them as honorable, when they said to Judge Schofield they were seeking exactly the evidence that they got?

MR. MAJOR: Your Honor, the investigations that are ongoing in Nigeria have yielded evidence that has then been used in the English courts, but there is nothing impermissible about that. That is not — the discretionary factors do not, you know, it covered this type of information where I don't think that the Court can say that I — first of all, I don't think that Nigeria has blown its credibility with the Southern District of New York. That's not one of the discretionary factors for the Court to consider.

THE COURT: I can consider whether it's an end runaround or other proof-seeking mechanisms and so forth.

Presumably, one issue is whether I can bank what representations Nigeria is making to me, and one of the better indications of that is whether their representations to Judge Schofield proved accurate.

MR. MAJOR: Your Honor, we argued to Judge Schofield

not that it was just speculation at that point in time about where the materials may be used, but we argued that we had the entitlement under Second Circuit precedent for the materials to be used in other foreign proceedings. There is nothing impermissible about that.

THE COURT: May I ask you, I note that this time around, although the argument is that you're seeking the information from VR Advisory, principally for criminal proceedings, this time you are not ruling out the secondary use of that material in the English proceedings; is that correct?

MR. MAJOR: Yes, your Honor, and I don't think we ruled it out. I understand the rank speculation, but our point, at that point in time, was that it was not known where it was going to be used, but we did not rule it out. We argued that it could be used in other foreign proceedings. We made that argument, we cited the case law, and I just want to emphasize that point because, obviously, when candid to the Court, when called into question, that raises a large concern for us, but we were not saying that it wouldn't be used. What we were saying is that the argument, at that point in time, had no factual basis.

THE COURT: May I ask you, if you weren't seeking the information from VR for a criminal investigation purpose, but solely for the English proceedings, would 1782 be available to you for that use?

MR. MAJOR: Yes, your Honor, absolutely.

Another point about the speculation was, what was happening in England at the time of that briefing, was that the Federal Republic of Nigeria was trying to get permission to bring the case. Now we know from the English judgment that was handed down a few weeks ago, they can bring that case and will bring that case. Therefore, it is likely, that if there is fruitful information discovered, that it will not only be used for the foreign investigation that's going on in Nigeria, but it will also be used in the English court as the Second Circuit explicitly permits.

If I can make one point about the overall argument that the respondents have, they're telling your Honor — they're asking you to make a discretionary call. That's not all that they're asking. They're asking your Honor to find that there a blanket prohibition against the Attorney Generals of other countries in using Section 1782. That is completely contrary to the statute —

THE COURT: I mean, maybe that's their intention. I didn't read their papers that way.

Let me ask you just to their point. Other than the applications from Nigeria, have you been able to find examples where a foreign criminal prosecutor, not Nigeria, was granted judicial assistance under 1782 without availing themselves of the MLAT procedure first?

MR. MAJOR: No. The only thing that holds otherwise is the case in the Eastern District of Virginia was wrongly decided. The quote from the case, it says that it miscites or misrecites the Intel factor, factor 3. It circumvents the procedure that the Government of the United States or the Government of the Republic of Nigeria had established referring to the MLAT, but the Intel factor actually says it circumvents the foreign proof gathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign state of the U.S.

I think your Honor's question a little earlier raised this point, which is, is there a policy of the U.S. that would prohibit the production of these documents that we're asking for, and there is. The Section 1782 permits it. Counsel for the respondent here conceded that we met the statutory requirements in the earlier Judge Schofield proceedings.

So the statutory factors having been met, the respondents are searching for a way to somehow delay or avoid discovery and citing to the MLAT, but the MLAT, by its own terms, provides no limitation under Section 1782, and quite to the contrary, article 19 specifically says that it does not limit procedures of other law, including, obviously, the statutes of the United States.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Major. Just brief couple of minutes of rebuttal, if any, from Mr. Rosenbaum.

MR. ROSENBAUM: Your Honor, I'll be very brief because

I know the Court is pressed for time.

The third intel factor is an attempt to circumvent policies of the United States. The linear policies of the United States that are actually memorialized in the MLAT, I think there was some discussion around one or two, but I think I did put a fine point on it. For example, as I mentioned, Attorney General Malami is the central authority. The MLAT proscribes that these central authorities, meaning Mr. Malami shall, not may, communicate directly with each other, meaning he shall communicate with the U.S. central authority for the purposes of this treaty.

So, further --

THE COURT: I'm sorry, Mr. Rosenbaum, that's just process. In terms of the output that would likely have arisen had Nigeria pursued the MLAT, is there some reason to think that emerging from the MLAT process would be a more stripped-down, approved set of document or information requests?

MR. ROSENBAUM: I believe so, your Honor, for the reasons I outlined earlier. The structure of the MLAT and the DOJ guidance does not call for, in my view and from what I've seen, these types of sweeping requests. There is more specificity towards the documents requested, not a broad category, but — so that's specific here.

As to some of the more sweeping issue, first of all,

we are not seeking an outright prohibition. We've said, on multiple times, that we are seeking to exercise the Court's discretion. Supreme Court juris prudence going back centuries requires that the Court put a treaty and statute on equal footing, and whenever possible, reconcile that.

Here, when you look at the specificity of the MLAT, the standard procedure, as it appears for every MLAT participant, except for Nigeria, even some of the permissive pieces of an MLAT, for example, the U.S. central authority, in this instance, may deny — this is article 3, section 1, sub part D., if the executioner requests, and is contrary with our constitution, which we talk about in our papers, but also if there was prejudice with security or other essential national interests of the state.

Now, we do not know, we, as VR, do not know whether that could or would be the case, but that's the exactly why the first stop in this sequence, we submit, as a matter of expression, not as a matter of prohibition, should be and universally is, except here, through the MLAT with the DOJ.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this, I mean, you're not saying that the MLAT requires, in every case, that it be used ahead of any civil statute, like 1782. You're saying that that's the ordinary course. There's no law that literally holds what you are saying, that the MLAT has to take priority. You're describing committee and general practice, but not some

legal prohibition; right?

MR. ROSENBAUM: Correct. We're urging the Court to reconcile the treaty with the permissive. That's why I underscored it at the outset, the nature of 1782, and we think the way to harmonize that is with sequence, not prohibition.

THE COURT: If the U.S. Justice Department approved three out of the 50-some-odd document calls here and didn't approve the rest, and Nigeria then said, you know what, on top of those three, there are five, or six, or seven we really, really want, and we're going to pursue those under 1782. Wouldn't your first argument be, you can't do that, you went through the MLAT and the MLAT procedure resulted in your being limited to just three, not the additional seven or so?

MR. ROSENBAUM: Your Honor, I believe we would be still in the discretionary realm of 1782, not the mandatory. So, yes, I can't imagine a world in which we wouldn't make that argument, but we would make it as a matter of discretion. I think the key to this is the Court would, in that instance, have the benefit of the DOJ's reasoning in exercising its discretion, which is why we submit -- and I can't think of a reason contrary to this, which is why I think it is the universal practice --

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Why would you have the benefit of DOJ's reasoning? If DOJ turned away certain requests, would that ordinarily be made known to the subpoena recipient, or

would all that would that be made known be that DOJ had approved the three document calls that it approved?

MR. ROSENBAUM: Well, I think we naturally know it because that presupposes that Nigeria would then come back apart from the -- if I'm understanding the hypothetical correctly, if Nigeria would come back to the court to 1782 and seek the other two.

MLAT would be, if the MLAT process only resulted in the approval of a small subset of what Nigeria was seeking, that would be what VR Advisory would be ordered or would be subpoenaed to produce pursuant to the MLAT, but there wouldn't be some internal administrative opinion coming out of DOJ that VR Advisory would know of, to the effect that DOJ had chosen not to approve the lie and share of what was proposed to it. You might discover that through informal discussions or perhaps you might be compelled to in a later 1782 proceeding if the Court asked you the question, but in the ordinary course, I don't think it would be visible to you what DOJ had not approved, only that which it had approved.

MR. ROSENBAUM: I agree with that, your Honor. I may have been misconstruing the hypothetical. I thought there was a second leg of it where Nigeria subsequently sought the other two or ten that were rejected by the DOJ through a direct 1782 --

THE COURT: Right. The issue would then be you wouldn't necessarily know. You would presumably then say, hey, you should go to the MLAT for that, too, and then maybe it would get smoked out that that had already been tried.

Can you conceive of any circumstance where any foreign executive branch could justifiably not pursue an MLAT in the first instance?

MR. ROSENBAUM: Meaning in a criminal proceeding?
THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ROSENBAUM: I think that -- I can't conceive of one. There perhaps would be, and I think, in some circumstances, the Court certainly could exercise its discretion to allow it. We submit that, where there is an MLAT, and, again, as a matter of discretion and sequence, the Court should exercise discretion at first to have Nigeria first exercise its right through the MLAT, which, by the way, as we all know, then typically results in a 1782 proceeding that's advanced by the U.S. Department of Justice.

THE COURT: One final question for you. You heard me question your adversary about the representation that was made to Judge Schofield. I take it your firm was not involved at that stage?

MR. ROSENBAUM: Our firm was involved. My colleagues on the line were directly involved. I believe we were the recipients of the representation, yes.

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THE COURT: Right, but at that time, though, I thought the subpoena was directed at -- was it directed at VR advisory?

MR. ROSENBAUM: Yes, it was directed at certain financials institutions. We were involved on behalf of P&ID in that proceeding, but we were not representing any of the subpoena recipients.

THE COURT: When the statement was made that it was rank speculation, what do you understand of the context of that proceeding at that time, that to connote.

MR. ROSENBAUM: To me, that would connote that counsel was informed that there was no intention to use that information in the English proceeding. I don't know any other way to interpret this.

THE COURT: The information that was sought, I mean, I read the papers, as you can tell, to be seeking information including, quote, bribe payments, meaning things of value and so forth. Did what was produced in response to the 1782 depart from what was forecast or sought in the declaration seeking the 1782 by Nigeria?

MR. ROSENBAUM: From what I understand, the request was somewhat broad, but there were bank records and it was bank records that were produced. I don't know if that fully answers your Honor's question. I only want to provide what I know.

THE COURT: -- speculation that really potent evidence would be produced, as opposed to bank records that were a

nonevent. I'm trying to figure out whether the word "rank speculation" can be justified on the grounds of, sure we were hoping to get a smoking gun, we never really were anything more than speculating that was there, and lo and behold, we got it.

MR. ROSENBAUM: Yes, but I would submit, your Honor, yes, then it's just a fishing expedition. In other words, that would call into question the entire purpose for that 1782 application. I mean, you can't just serve a subpoena on any bank in any part of the world in a hope of turning something up. You have to have a good-faith basis to do it. I think it's only in that context that the Court can consider what was meant by rank speculation at that time.

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. Very helpful, spirited argument on both sides. I'll take this under advisement. In the first instance, we need to come to terms with the issue involving the employee. Kobre & Kim, I think you need to give some hard, internal thought and discussion with that employee just to make a judgment about what's best for him and the firm. In the short-term, if there isn't a resolution reached, I will need what I sought from you.

All right. Thank you, counsel. We stand adjourned.

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